

Constants in GCM Security Bounds Are at Least . . .

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GCM, Galois/Counter Mode

- NIST SP 800-38D, the benchmark for the CAESAR competition
- If $|N| = 96$ is not guaranteed, then GCM security bounds have a constant ($3,524,578 \leq 2^{22}$) [IOM12]
 - Do we really need the constant? Can it be smaller?

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[IOM12] Tetsu Iwata, Keisuke Ohashi, Kazuhiko Minematsu: Breaking and Repairing GCM Security Proofs. CRYPTO 2012: 31-49

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
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
Counter Collision

- $|N|, |N'| \neq 96$
- $\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N') \Leftrightarrow \text{inc}^r(\text{GHASH}_L(N)) = \text{GHASH}_L(N')$



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Counter Collision Probability

- [Lemma 2, IOM12] For any r , N , and N' ,

$$\Pr_L[\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N')] \leq 3,524,578 \times d / 2^{128}$$

$$- d = \max\{ \deg(\text{GHASH}_L(N)), \deg(\text{GHASH}_L(N')) \}$$

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- Source of the constant in the security bounds
- $\Pr_L[\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N')] \geq ???$

Result

- $r = 0x55555555$
- $N = 0x8d44009c, dc550100, 00000000, 00000000$
- $N' = 0x5b6dbdd9, f3b151d9, d1bc4145, ecb396ef$
- $|N| = |N'| = 128$
- $\Pr_L[\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N')] = 1,762,290 / 2^{128}$
- Anyone can verify the result (programming is needed)

Implication

- There exist r , N , and N' such that

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr_L[\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N')] &= 1,762,290 / 2^{128} \\ &= 881,145 \times 2 / 2^{128} \\ &\geq 2^{19.74} \times 2 / 2^{128}\end{aligned}$$

- To prove the security of GCM, [IOM12] uses “the sum bound”

$$\Pr_L[\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N') \text{ for some } r] \leq \sum_r \Pr_L[\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N')]$$

- If we follow the proof strategy, then the constant cannot be less than $881,145 \geq 2^{19.74}$

How?

- $\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N') \Leftrightarrow \text{inc}^r(\text{GHASH}_L(N)) = \text{GHASH}_L(N')$
- when $|N| = |N'| = 128$
$$\text{inc}^r(N \cdot L^2 \text{ xor } |N| \cdot L) = N' \cdot L^2 \text{ xor } |N'| \cdot L \quad (1)$$
- $r = 0x55555555$, rewrite (1) in bits using 256 variables
- find the values of the 256 variables where (1) has as many solutions as possible
 - $\Pr_L[\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N')] = \# \text{ solutions of (1)} / 2^{128}$
 - designed a greedy algorithm to select equations, used linearization to obtain linear equations, Gaussian elimination, . . .

Conclusion

- [Lemma 2, IOM12] For any r , N , and N' ,
$$\Pr_L[\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N')] \leq 3,524,578 \times d / 2^{128} \leq 2^{21.75} \times d / 2^{128}$$
- There exist r , N , and N' such that
$$\Pr_L[\text{Coll}_L(r, N, N')] = 881,145 \times 2 / 2^{128} \geq 2^{19.74} \times 2 / 2^{128}$$
- If we use “the sum bound,” then the constant in GCM security bounds is at least

$2^{19.74}$